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Abstract 
Global Value Chain proponents argue that regional and human 
development can be achieved through ‘strategic coupling’ with 
transnational corporations. This argument is misleading for two reasons. 
First, GVC abstracts firm-firm and firm-state relations from their class-
relational basis, obscuring fundamental developmental processes. Second, 
much GVC analysis promotes linear conceptions of development. This 
article provides a class-relational framework for GVC analysis. The 
formation and functioning of GVCs and the developmental effects 
associated with them are products of histories of evolving and often 
conflictive, class relations. A study of export horticulture in North East 
Brazil provides empirical support for these arguments.  
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
The theoretical concepts and policy prescriptions associated with the Global 
Commodity chain, Global Value chain and Global Production Network (GCC, 
GVC, GPN, henceforth GVC) approaches have migrated from academia to the 
policy mainstream. From the World Bank, to UNCTAD, to the OECD to the 
WTO, GVC analysis is everywhere. For example, the OECD secretary general 
Angel Gurr´ıa recently stated that: 
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[e]veryone can benefit from global value chains . . . [and]we will all benefit 
more if governments take steps to enhance the new business 
environment…[furthermore]…encouraging the development of and 
participation in global value chains is the road to more jobs and sustainable 
growth for our economies.i 
 
This article argues that whilst GVC analysis makes potentially useful 
contributions to our understanding of the global political economy, in its current 
form it generates a misleading conception of development under capitalism. It 
obscures how class relations underpin the processes that it focuses upon - 
relations between firms, their existence within institutional environments shaped 
by states, and the developmental outcomes of these interactions. And it hides 
from view and often de-legitimates other paths to human development are hidden 
from view and often delegitimised.   
 This article uses a class-relational perspective to construct an alternative 
framework for conducting GVC analysis. It modifies Amartya Sen’s advocacy of 
development as a process that expands human freedoms through increasing 
individuals’ abilities and choices. ii  In contrast to Sen’s methodological 
individualist conception of society, however, it analytically prioritises class 
relations. The expansion of freedoms for members of different social classes 
depends on myriad factors, including one that Sen does not discuss or attempt to 
theorise - the balance of class power between labour and capital.iii   
The GVC concept, despite concern with ‘value’ and especially ‘value-
added’ has no coherent theory of value. This article, by contrast, adopts Marx’s 
labour theory of value in conjunction with a relational class analysis. iv   
‘Class’ here is understood as simultaneously a theoretical category (with 
which to undertake class analysis), and an objective thing (such as really existing 
labouring and capitalist classes). The labour theory of value and Marx’s relational 
conception of social class represent theoretical abstractions. Their political 
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economic application constitutes class analysis. The move from abstract theory 
to concrete analysis of social formations and their relations entails a dual process 
of complexification (the introduction of ever new determinants and mediations 
into the analysis) and clarification (illustrating how these new introductions relate 
to the foundational class categories).  
Much value chain analysis adopts a linear conception of development – 
where ‘correct’ policies are transformed into successful developmental outcomes. 
But real development does not work like that. Unintended consequences and 
responses to them are as important as intended policy formulation and 
implementation. The combination of intended actions and unintended 
consequences constitutes the development process. Many of these unintended 
consequences and responses to elite-level policy arise out of conflictual class 
dynamics. But because these dynamics are evacuated from most GVC analysis, 
the latter is rarely able to account for them either empirically or theoretically.  
Globally constituted capital-labour relations – entailing in-firm relations 
between capital and labour and broader international processes of class formation 
and organisation – represent the sub-structure upon which the existence of firms, 
states, and their interaction rises.  
 The argument here it is twofold. First, that those academics and 
institutions that present themselves as proffering up useful policy advice to 
developing regions need to be more modest in their claims, and to recognise that 
human development often occurs in ways that their firm-centric framework’s are 
ill-placed to comprehend. Second, that workers’ organisations and their collective 
actions are developmental, that they should be respected as such by the 
aforementioned academics and institutions, and given greater importance in 
considering how human development can be advanced.  
 The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section two provides 
a critique of mainstream GVC analysis, and in particular, the weakness of the 
strategic-coupling concept. Section three provides some building blocks for class-
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relational GVC analysis.  Section four  illustrates empirically the UK contribution 
to the emergence of the global retail revolution and the specific class-relations 
that underpinned it, an analysis of the formation and global integration of a 
dynamic sector of export horticulture in North East Brazil, and the global 
interaction between these two initially relatively discreet but subsequently 
increasingly intertwined social dynamics. 
 
2 - LIMITS TO GVC ANALYSIS 
 
GVC analysis is potentially useful in at least two ways. First, it illustrates with 
empirical clarity the fallacy of the idea of the ‘free market’. It shows how relations 
between and within firms are coordinated and that value chains exist within a 
broader institutional environment. Within this environment stats actions extend 
beyond enhancing the business environment, to enabling the formation and 
interaction of new value chains, and in raising the possibilities of rapid innovation 
within firms and throughout these chains. Secondly, it breaks down prior 
methodological nationalist conception of development and pushes us to rethink 
its global dimensions.  
 Despite these insights, mainstream GVC analysis suffers from a firm-
centrism which de-links underlying social (class) relations from the formation, 
functioning and developmental outcomes associated with GVCs. To grasp why 
this is so requires a short detour into the evolution of the GVC concept.  
 
 
2.1 - From GCC’s to GPN’s: The Evolution of the Value Chain Concept 
It is now more than 20 years since the operationalization of the Global 
Commodity chain (GCC) concept and its offshoots. v Since the mid 1990s the 
GCC framework has been reformulated into Global Value chain (GVC) and 
Global Production Network (GPN) analyses.vi  
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In their initial formulation Gereffi et al. vii  sought to operationalise the 
earlier World Systems Theory conception of Global Value chains. viii  The 
formation and functioning of GCCs was explained by Gereffi et al., as arising out 
of transformations in production and distribution, which were themselves driven 
by processes of techno-industrial, regulatory and managerial change. GCC 
analysis aimed to identify and facilitate the investigation of power relations and 
interactions between firms within, and non-firm actors beyond the value chain, 
and the developmental consequences of these new relationships on firms and 
regions in the global south.  
Gereffi and his colleagues decided to change the terminology of GCC to 
GVC in the 2000’s to investigate in more nuanced ways relations between firms 
within particular economic sectors, at the expense of prior concerns with extra-
value chain actors.ix As Bair summarises, the evolution from the WST conception 
of GCC in the 1970s and 1980s, to the operationalization of GCC in the mid 
1990s, to the GVC concept in the early 2000s, represented a continuing shift in 
political economic focus: From the world capitalist economy, to inter-firm 
networks in global industries, to sectoral logics of global industries.x  
The GVC framework has been criticised in various ways. For example, 
Henderson et al.,  argued that GCC/GVC approaches ignore processes of local-
level embeddedness and argue for conceptually incorporating labour as a 
constitutive aspect of the ‘territorial context’.xi Phil Taylor also notes the irony 
that the GVC concept  has no explicit theorisation of value.xii   
 Henderson et al. and others associated with the ‘Manchester School’ 
formulated the Global Production Network (GPN) approach as a means of 
overcoming GCC/GVC’s excessive focus on inter-firm relations. Whilst 
recognising and incorporating the strengths of GCC/GVC (the focus on changing 
inter-firm relations and their developmental consequences) GPN analysis sought 
to emphasise aspects of value creation, power and social embededness. GPN 
notions of power, value creation and local-level embeddedness, whilst intuitively 
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necessary for a deeper comprehension of development, lose analytical purchase 
in application because they are not founded in an internally integrated conception 
of capitalist reproduction.  
A particularly influential case of such a ‘de-classed’ political economy is 
the concept of ‘strategic coupling’ developed by GPN proponents. An illustration 
of this concept’s limitations provides a rationale for the formulating of a different 
theoretical and conceptual starting point to GVC analysis.  
 
2.2 - Beyond Strategic Coupling 
GVC analysis, where relations between firms and their institutional environment 
are given pride of place, simplifies the social world to such an extent that it 
generates a distorted understanding of it, and therefore represents a poor guide to 
achieving genuine human development. For example, UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report 2013, advances a framework for assisting developing states 
and agencies to link up with lead firms in order to stimulate regional development. 
The report suggests that: 
 
Active promotion of GVCs and GVC-led development strategies imply the 
encouragement and provision of support to economic activities aimed at 
generating exports in fragmented and geographically dispersed industry 
value chains, based on a narrower set of endowments and competitive 
advantages. And they imply active policies to encourage learning from 
GVC activities in which a country is present, to support the process of 
upgrading towards higher value added activities and diversifying into 
higher value added value chains.xiii 
 
Within GPN analysis the above formulations have been couched in terms 
of ‘strategic coupling’ which refers to ‘the dynamic processes through which 
actors in cities and/or regions coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage strategic 
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interests between local actors and their counterparts in the global economy’.xiv 
More recently, Yeung has refined the concept of strategic coupling, arguing that 
it needs to take into account existing ‘spatial differentiation within the national 
economy’ to formulate sector-specific industrial policies rather than ‘generic pro-
GPN policies’, and that ‘[d]eveloping industrial policies orientated towards 
promoting a niche in a particular sector or intra-sectoral segment can…make 
good sense for regional development’.xv  Despite these attempts at reformulation, 
there are at least two foundational problems with this concept.  
 The first problem is that it rests upon assumptions of intentionality: 
Regional actors are interpreted (and advised) to facilitate firms’ upgrading within 
GVCs. The emphasis on intentionality – and the attempt to illustrate how 
successful cases of upgrading are products of it – misses how contemporary forms 
of ‘coupling’ or global integration have their roots in historically prior, non-
intentional, and geographically un-related political economic processes (see 
section 4 below). As Danny MacKinnon puts it, ‘coupling processes…tend to be 
more organic than strategic in nature, based on processes of co-evolution’.xvi 
There is no attempt within the strategic coupling concept to theorise how 
unintended consequences shape developmental processes. This simplifies the 
concept (making it amenable to ideological policy formulation) but undermines 
its analytical value.  
 The second problem with the concept of strategic coupling stems from its 
advocates’ reluctance to systemically incorporate class relations into their 
conceptual schema. For example, Yeung suggests that negative consequences of 
strategic coupling within GPN’s may include social and class conflicts.xvii Further, 
Yeung and Coe argue that ‘dark sides’ to strategic coupling include becoming 
locked into ‘race-to-the-bottom’ forms of global integration with deleterious 
impacts upon local labour forces.xviii  
 These formulations ignore how class conflicts, in particular those waged 
by states and firms against peasants and workers, are constitutive of the formation 
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of employable/exploitable workforces. From Marx’s analysis of the 
dispossession of the English peasantry in Capital Vol. 1, to the violent conditions 
under which labour markets were created and workers employed across East Asia, 
such actions are the precondition for systematic competitive capital accumulation.  
Yeung’s formulation also ignores how lead and supplier firms may collaborate 
with local states to engender proletarianisation and impose intense labour 
discipline on newly emerging labouring classes as part of their strategies of global 
integration, upgrading and expansion.xix 
  Yeung’s classification of social and class conflicts as a potential negative 
consequences of strategic coupling disables him from considering how such 
struggles (from below) can generate impulses towards ‘social upgrading’ and 
more progressive forms of regional development. Put differently, the possibility 
that such struggles may ‘unlock’ a region from a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ trajectories 
of global integration is absent. This reflects a conceptual firm-centric denial that 
labouring class organisations and collective actions are potentially 
developmental.xx   
 The concept of strategic coupling tends towards the a-historical and a-
social. It is profoundly conservative in that it identifies class struggles as 
deleterious outcomes of mal-development and as coming from below, and it 
naturalises class struggles from above as part and parcel of the normal, ‘correct’, 
development process.  
In their advice to state actors to facilitate such linking-up, strategic-
coupling proponents’ starting point is the existence of firms (with employable 
labour forces) that are potentially able to undertake such ventures, rather than the 
broader historical question of how these firms actually came to be in such a 
position. There is an element here of assuming what should be explained. The 
existence of these firms can rarely be reduced to intentional policy and are more 
often the outcome of more contradictory and conjunctural historical processes.  
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 The concept of strategic coupling is therefore ill-placed to comprehend 
indeterminant development processes. Policies implemented today will have a 
very different developmental impact tomorrow because the world will have 
changed between today and tomorrow due, in part to those policies, but also, and 
fundamentally, to responses to those policies by myriad social forces.xxi  The 
following section provides the beginnings of alternative, class-relational 
theoretico-methodological building blocks for undertaking GVC analysis, with 
the objectives of overcoming the weaknesses identified here.  
   
  
3 CLASS-RELATIONS AND GVC ANALYSIS 
A class relational GVC analysis does not seek to ‘bring class back into’ the 
framework, but reconstitutes GVC analysis on the basis of class analysis. It 
entails at least four dimensions: 
a) A comprehension of class as inherently relational. Marxist class analysis 
understands class relations as based, primarily, upon exploitation of one class by 
another. Such a conception contrasts to non-relational, hierarchical, income-
based theories of class.xxii 
b) A focus upon the capitalist labour process (LP).xxiii  The core of LP analysis is 
the focus on how managers organise work to ensure competitive capital 
accumulation, and how workers resist such moves by managers in order to 
maximise their freedom at and beyond work. LP analysis entails investigating  the 
sphere of production and the interactions, changing relationships, and in 
particular, changing balances of power between workers and managers. However, 
as Kelly notes, maximising the value of LP theory requires extending the analysis 
of strategies of managerial control to the whole circuit of capital, rather than an 
exclusive focus on the workplace.xxiv  And, as Fitzgerald argues, LP analysis 
should begin with the workplace and then extend ‘outward’ to incorporate wider 
processes of the reproduction of class relations.xxv (And, see below). 
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c) A methodological globalist conception of class: Rather than comprehending 
class relations as existing solely within territorially bounded units (principally 
firms and states) derived from a methodological nationalist perspective, it is 
necessary to understand class relations as globally determined. Methodological 
globalism begins from the totality of the world system and incorporates its 
international, national, sub-national determinants.  From this vantage point it is 
possible, for example, to identify ways in which class relations in different parts 
of the world co-determine each other’s development.xxvi  
d) A re-constituted conception of inter-firm relations: This article, like 
mainstream GVC analysis, acknowledges that inter-firm relations are, in part, 
determined by a combination of competitive dynamics between firms within an 
institutional environment dominated by states. However, its objective is to 
illuminate how globally formed capital-labour relations are both determinants of 
inter-firm (and state) relations, and dialectically, how these class relations are 
mediated by firms and states. This move roots a class-relational GVC analysis 
within a dialectically constituted horizontal (firm-firm) and vertical (capital-
labour) political economy context.  
The remainder of this section show how a focus upon the above-mentioned 
dimensions can provide an alternative interpretation of what GVC analysis can 
investigate and illuminate and how.   
 
3.1 – The Labour Regime 
That capital employs labour on an exploitative basis requires the existence of a 
labour force. The term ‘labour regime’ draws attention to the ‘different modes of 
recruiting/mobilising labour and organising it in production’.xxvii  Mainstream 
GVC analysis approaches the question of labour from a human-capital 
perspective. It enquires into and investigates the policies that states and firms 
need to implement to generate a sufficiently skilled labour force. But it rarely 
takes the further socio-historical step of enquiring into how regional labour forces 
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were established initially. Where it does it explains the existence of such labour 
forces as emerging from market forces of supply and demand. But this still leaves 
untouched the question of where workers, with nothing to sell but their labour 
power, originally come from. Labour regime analysis is necessarily multi-scalar, 
encompassing investigation of global, continental, national, regional and local 
dimensions of such regimes. As will be discussed below, TNCs globe-spanning 
activities rest upon a continually reforming global labouring class.  
 
3.2 – The Capitalist Labour Process 
The capitalist labour process (LP) is an outcome of workers’ institutional 
incorporation into the capitalist systems as sellers of labour power.  It combines 
two sub-processes, a) the production of use and exchange values, and b) the 
production and expropriation of surplus value. The power relations that reproduce 
the capitalist labour process are largely invisible to mainstream value chain 
analysis. These relations entail changes in the ways workers relate to each other 
and the ways in which managers are able to organise workers’ labour: 
 
The power that capital has to pursue these objectives is in part…the 
power… to select, design or develop machinery and other aspects of the 
technology involved in the labour process…. [Capital] must therefore 
organise…. a system of power relations the function of which is to define 
and enforce the discipline of the labour process (original emphasis).xxviii  
 
That Capital has the institutional right to purchase workers’ labour power and 
direct it does not mean that it is all powerful in the sphere of production. As Harry 
Braverman noted ‘what the worker sells and the capitalist buys, is not an agreed 
amount of labour, but the power to labour over an agreed period of time’ and 
consequently, ‘it thus becomes essential for the capitalist that control over the 
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labour process pass from the hands of the workers into his own’ (1988 [1974]: 
37, 39).xxix  
 The exploitative nature of the capital-labour relation generates repeated 
conflicts between workers and managers/owners of capital, and in these conflicts 
workers possess two distinct sources of bargaining power. ‘Structural power’ 
accrues to workers from their ability to disrupt the production process through 
suspension of work. ‘Associational power’ is generated through workers’ 
organisations such as trade unions and political parties, that can, if sufficiently 
well organised, use workers’ structural power as a means of forcing employers to 
ameliorate worker’s pay and conditions. xxx  
 
3.3 – Geography and the Social Relations of Scale 
 GVC literatures tend to interpret globalised production and sourcing processes 
as means for lead firms to increase competitiveness through cutting costs and 
outsourcing risk. Such interpretations identify the opportunities for and 
imperatives of upgrading for newly emerging supplier firms in the global south.  
But they continue to treat worker’s labour power as only a commodity input into 
production. Consequently they tend to de-politicise, de-historicise and de-
socialise production. 
 An alternative comprehension of capital’s globalising tendencies is 
provided by Beverly Silver who illustrates how for the auto and textile industries 
- the emblematic producer and buyer-driven value chains - the spatial expansion 
of capital, whilst facilitated by technological change was equally driven by 
conflictual class relations and capital’s attempts to escape labour militancy.xxxi 
Silver illuminates a global capital-labour dialectic where scale and location of 
production is not determined only by cost and profitability, but underpinned by a) 
the availability of an exploitable working class (established and disciplined by 
state actions) and b) attempts to escape zones of labour militancy which threaten 
capital’s profitability and authority over the production process.  
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 The establishment of globalised systems of production through GVCs 
represents the geographical reconstitution of capital-labour relations which 
generates both new opportunities and risks for further capital accumulation.xxxii 
Opportunities include those of geographically dispersing the labour process and 
fragmenting (in new ways) labouring classes. Risks include the generation of new 
‘choke points’ and possibilities of ‘bullwhip effects’ where stoppages of work in 
one node of the value chain disrupt the functioning of other nodes, and the value 
chain as a whole.  
 
3.3 – Value chain Governance: The Social and Technical Division of Labour and 
the Collective Workerxxxiii 
A two-sided division of labour obtains in capitalist production and exchange. On 
the one hand a ‘technical’ division of labour exists within the firm consisting of 
a detailed and calculated division and allocation of tasks amongst workers 
overseen by mangers. On the other hand the social division of labour is governed 
through commodity exchange on the market. According to Marx, the former is 
planned whilst the latter is anarchic because there is no overriding authority:  
 
Division of labour within the workshop implies the undisputed authority 
of the capitalist over men who are merely members of a total mechanism 
that belongs to him. The division of labour within the society brings into 
contact independent producers of commodities, who acknowledge no other 
authority but that of competition.xxxiv  
 
Marx characterised this two-sided division of labour as containing an anarchic 
element, as buyers and sellers of different commodities related to each other 
through the market. However, the GVC conception of chain governance shows 
how TNCs have attempted to transcend some of the anarchic aspects of the world 
market through intra and inter-firm coordination.  
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 Value chain governance is often explained in terms derived from 
transaction cost economics. xxxv  Here lead firms exercise high degrees of 
coordination over subordinate supplier firms through standardisation and 
specification of products, the use of information communication technologies to 
facilitate just-in-time delivery systems. Such measures are intended to increase 
predictability of transactions, the efficiency of production and to increase lead 
firm profitability. However, value chain governance can also be understood from 
a class-relational perspective, as a process of creating, employing and managing 
a global collective worker. As Marx noted: 
  
All combined labour on a large scale requires…a directing authority… to 
secure the harmonious working of the individual activities, and to perform 
the general functions that have their origin in the action of the combined 
organism, as distinguished from the action of its separate organs. A single 
violin player is his own conductor: an orchestra requires a separate one. 
xxxvi 
 
Under contemporary global capitalism the conductors of the orchestra are led 
firms that circumscribe very tightly the conditions of production within supplier 
firms, through product standardisation and specification. Workers in supplier 
firms are ‘like a hand, watched, corrected, and controlled by a distant brain’.xxxvii 
Whilst the exact content and rhythm of the labour process is decided by the direct 
employing firm, its parameters are pre-set by lead firm-designed product and 
process specifications.  
The formation of the collective worker is both an outcome and a 
constitutive feature of international wage differentiation. The global 
manufacturing system and lead firm strategies of value chain governance 
disperses the labour process on a global scale to separate out skilled from 
unskilled work and generate a corresponding wage hierarchy.xxxviii Dispersal of 
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production both reduces labour costs and enlarges the global labour pool to 
increase competition between geographically differentiated workers. And yet, as 
will be discussed in the next section, despite capital’s strategies to fragment 
global labouring classes and reduce their bargaining power, workers enjoy new 
forms of structural and associational power which can be used to ameliorate their 
circumstances and generate progressive human developmental outcomes.  
 
4 - THE GLOBAL RETAIL REVOLUTION, EXPORT GRAPE PRODUCTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH EAST BRAZIL 
 
This section illuminates the rise of the UK segment of the global retail revolution 
and the emergence and global integration of dynamic export horticulture in North 
East Brazil. It highlights the class relations underpinning both processes, and 
shows, from a methodological globalist perspective, how these initially distinct 
processes became intertwined and co-determining.  
One of the most salient transformations in agricultural production, 
distribution and consumption since the 1970s and the dismantling of the ‘national 
food regimes’ associated with the ‘development project’, has been its upward 
integration into new circuits of globalised capital.xxxix In Latin America non-
traditional agricultural exports (NTAX’s) – cut flowers from Ecuador, wine and 
fruits from Chile, peanuts from Nicaragua, winter vegetables from Peru, Mexico 
and Guatamala, Soy from Argentina and Brazil -  have become new sources of 
foreign exchange. As William Robinson notes, NTAX’s have transformed the 
countryside across Latin America in a number of ways, through: 1) the increasing 
dominance of local agricultural systems by trans-national capital, 2) the 
displacement of the peasantry and its conversion into a rural proletariat, 3) the 
use of casualised work practices by employers, 4) the predominance of women 
workers in NTAX sectors, and 5) ‘the articulation of local agricultural systems to 
the global supermarket’.xl NTAX production is integrated into global circuits of 
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production and exchange in novel ways compared to ‘traditional agriculture’ 
because it require greater financial outlays to start-up and maintain production, 
and is highly dependent on a range of upstream industrial inputs, technical 
knowledge and techniques that are produced and often purchased from abroad.xli  
Transnational retail capital has become increasingly concentrated and 
centralised since the 1990s, through a ‘global retail revolution’. For example, the 
combined market share of the four largest US grocery retailers has grown from 
14% in 1984 to around 55% in 2001. xlii . The United Kingdom is the most 
advanced national segment of the global retail revolution. xliii  The value of 
imported fruit to the UK rose from approximately £1.47 billion to £2.08 billion 
between 1996 and 2006. xliv Within this global context, Brazil’s North East has 
become home to a dynamic centre of non-traditional export agriculture. This 
section plots, first, the British contribution to the Global Retail Revolution, and 
second, North East Brazil’s co-evolution to the point where the two dynamics 
began to intertwine through global value chains.  
 
4.1 From National to Global Retail Revolution 
The global retail revolution (GRR) is often portrayed as having it roots, in part, 
in the broader transformations associated with globalisation from the 1970s and 
1980s onwards – new communication and transport technologies, cool chains, 
structural adjustment programmes and renewed export focus across much of the 
global south (as in Robinson above). However, this is only part of the story. That 
the UK is the most advanced player in the GRR reflects its own history of 
economic restructuring that stretch back further than the above-mentioned 
innovations, entailing, crucially, changes in domestic class-relations. This 
restructuring of class relations transformed the British economy into what 
MacKinnon (2012, 237) calls a ‘generator region’ for retail capital’s global 
reach.xlv 
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Large corporate value chains in the UK more than doubled their share of 
total retail sales between 1950 (22%) to 1982 (56%).xlvi This mega concentration 
and centralisation of retail capital was facilitated in particular by specific forms 
of state regulation of large capital and of changes in the composition of the 
working class. The decline of the state-enforced resale price maintenance in the 
late 1950s and 1960s – under pressure from retail capital – gave newly emerging 
retail corporations the power to set their own (lower) prices for the food they sold, 
thereby cutting into profits of the independent retail sector. Corporate retailers 
began using ‘own brand’ labels to differentiate their products from their 
manufacturer-suppliers and increase cost-down pressures on the latter. The 
growing power of corporate retail capital in the UK signified a shift in the balance 
of power within the sector, representing the rise of increasingly ‘buyer-driven’ 
domestic retail value chains.  
 The concentration of corporate retail power was facilitated by the British 
state in at least three ways. First, In addition to its reluctance to reinforce resale 
price maintenance, it rarely pursued anti-monopoly legislation compared to other 
European states.xlvii Second, from the early 1980s the state played a central role 
in reshaping the UK labour market by using anti-trade union legislation to strictly 
limit workers’ ability to pursue collective actions, presiding over rising 
unemployment and cutting welfare entitlements to the working class. These 
measures had the effect of pushing wages down, raising the dependence of 
workers upon increasingly precarious employment, reducing working class 
families’ abilities to provide for their members while the latter pursued non-wage 
activities (such as education and training) thus pushing increasing number of 
unskilled workers into the workforce. As Marsden and Wrigley note ‘The 
deregulatory nation-state…. has delivered cheap pools of unskilled and semi-
skilled labour for retailers’.xlviii Corporate retail capital benefitted in particular 
from the national-level restructuring of the workforce. Most of the jobs created 
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in the sector were ‘part-time female positions, thus intensifying the broader trend 
towards the part-time, feminisation of the UK employment structure.xlix  
 A third way in which the UK state facilitated retail capital’s concentration 
and centralisation was through an emerging neoliberal regulatory environment, 
where large retailers were ‘delegated by the state key responsibilities for 
management and policing’ of the national food system (Marsden and Wrigely: 
1995, 1899).l From the early 1980s onwards corporate retail capital increasingly 
defined new consumption habits under the guise of representing ‘consumer 
interest’. This emerging role, which was extended further by the 1990 UK food 
safety act, provided retail capital with an extensive rationale for governing the 
food value chain – from sourcing to production to sale to consumption – which 
in turn reinforced its ability to further force cost-down pressures across the value 
chain onto manufacturer suppliers (Arce and Marsden: 1993).li  
A particular dilemma emerged, however, from this new configuration of 
capital-labour and production-consumption relations for retail capital in 
particular and for the UK state in general. This was how to generate rising levels 
of consumption in a context of stagnating real wages - to sustain corporate profits 
and to generate the ideological glue necessary to convince significant segments 
of the UK population that neoliberal restructuring was in their interest? Part of 
the solution to this problem was through the global sourcing of increasingly cheap 
wage goods and what were previously luxury niche consumption goods such as 
fresh fruits and vegetables. The Global Retail Revolution emerged not simply 
from corporate capital’s inherent competitive dynamic, or from technological 
innovations, or structural adjustment programmes in the global south, but also 
from specific UK-based class dynamics. And it was sustained by the expansion 
of export horticulture across new regions in the global south.  
 
 
4.2 Emergence of the Sáo Francisco Export Grape Sector: lii   
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Between the early 1990s and the mid to late 2000s the Sáo Francisco (SF) 
valley in North East Brazil, located around the cities of Petrolina and Juazeiro in 
the states of Pernambuco and Bahia respectively, emerged as the country’s largest 
exporter of high quality table grapes. During this period the UK retail sector was 
its most profitable export market. By the late 2000s the valley accounted for over 
90 percent of Brazilian grape exports because it was able to organise production 
to take advantage of periods of low supply in Europe. By the mid 2000s table 
grapes had become the region’s principal export crop, with export volumes and 
earnings increasing from 3,700 tons and US$4.7 million in 1997 to over 78,000 
tons and over US$170 million by 2007. Grape production expanded from 
approximately 4,500 hectares (ha) of vineyards in 2001, to around 12,100 ha by 
2007. liii  By the mid 2000s there were more than 50,000 workers employed in the 
grape sector alone.liv Behind this glittering success story, however, lies not a tale 
of far-sighted strategic coupling, but one of class struggle, dictatorship, and mega 
state investments.  
  During the second half of the twentieth century the Brazilian state pursued 
objectives of agrarian ‘modernisation’ as a means of increasing Brazilian 
economic competitiveness and stabilising rural and urban social relations. Cliff 
Welch notes how during the height of Brazil's Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) strategy, the Brazilian state sought to address the twin 
problem of generating and transferring income from agrarian to industrial sectors 
and alleviating rural social tensions through social policy. lv  These policies 
included attempts to incorporate rural labour under state patronage through 
providing rural workers with some political and economic reforms. For example, 
in 1963 the Goulart government passed the Rural Workers Statute which 
guaranteed to rural workers a minimum wage, a paid day off every week, paid 
holidays, maternity leave, job security after 10 years of employment, and 
employers obligation to sign each worker’s work card.  
Unexpectedly for state administrators, rural workers and small-holders 
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used the relatively permissive political space created by the state to agitate and 
organise for land reform and better working conditions. The agitation was rooted 
in the continuing extreme inequality of land distribution in Brazil, the dire 
conditions of the mass of rural labourers, and inspired by the 1959 Cuban 
revolution and its sweeping land reform programme . 
However, the government’s relatively close association with rural and 
urban workers combined with an economic slowdown and an increasing 
perception amongst the upper echelons of Brazilian society that workers were 
increasingly posing a threat of communism. lvi  These groups supported the 
military coup in April 1964 which sought to ‘exclude’ and ‘deactivate’ rural and 
urban ‘popular’ movements.lvii   
Following the coup the state unleashed a process of ‘conservative 
modernisation’. It repressed and eliminated the peasant movements, began a huge 
programme of modernising agriculture through its rapid capitalisation, and 
moved to incorporate agriculture into the industrial sector via the establishment 
of large-scale agro-industrial complexes.lviii Welch calculates that, consequently, 
more than 30 million workers left the rural sector between the 1960s and 1980s.lix 
Workers that that remained in the rural sector were subject to fast-changing 
imperatives: 
 
One fundamental characteristic of Brazilian development has been the 
super-exploitation of the different categories of rural wage labour, 
including the peons virtually enslaved on the large fazendas of the Amazon 
region... the ‘bóias-frias’(migrant day labourers) of the modern sugar-cane 
and orange plantations in São Paulo... and the workers in more traditional 
areas.lx 
 
 
  Within this broader national context, the Brazilian state was the primary 
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actor in the establishment of the São Francisco valley as a region of agrarian 
accumulation from the 1960s onwards. Importantly, given how the strategic 
coupling concept (over) emphasises policy intentionality, its initial objectives 
were not to stimulate high-value export horticulture. Rather it was to facilitate the 
expansion of basic-food crop production to provide cheap food to urban centres 
to minimise political disruption due to food shortages and to facilitate a model of 
industrial expansion based on cheap labour.  
 The emergence of irrigated agriculture in the Petrolina-Juazeiro region of 
the North East was part of a broader process of state investments in irrigation 
across the whole of Brazil beginning in the 1960s. The total area under public 
irrigation in Brazil expanded more than five-fold between 1960 and 1988. The 
North East increased its percentage of total public irrigated land from 11.4% to 
22.9% between 1960 and 1988.lxi From the late 1960s onwards over 100,000 
hecatares of land were converted to irrigated agriculture use in the SF region, 
through public and private investments.  
 These investments led to significant transformations of local social 
relations. Prior to the establishment of the SF valley’s horticulture sector, 
principal economic activities revolved around cattle-ranching, small-scale 
riverside and flood plain agriculture and artisan fishing (Chilcote 1990). On 
riverside plots landowners presided over sharecropping systems with live-in 
workers. Johnson (1971) notes how sharecropping systems often involved debt 
peonage and service in the patron’s militia. The development of irrigation 
projects ended these relations across much of the valley, as from the late 1960s 
onwards widespread flooding to construct the Sobradinho dam and large-scale 
land expropriations to construct the irrigation projects led to the displacement of 
both large landowners and smallholders. Many of the former ‘were reorganised 
as commercial enterprises structured around the . . . irrigation canals’ (Collins & 
Krippner 1999: 519), and whilst some smallholders became re-established as 
colonos (small-scale farmers) on the irrigation districts, many moved out of the 
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region.  
 
CODEVASF (Compania de Desenvolvimento do Rio São Francisco - the 
São Francisco River Basin Development Agency), established in 1974, has been 
the principal state agency responsible for managing the valley’s irrigation 
districts. It has done so through the provision of basic infrastructure, irrigation 
technology and technical assistance and rural extension which can be sub-divided 
into three periods.  
 
Phase One 1960s – Late 1970s: The federal state’s primary goal was initially to 
raise the North East’s food security. Basic food crops were to be produced both 
for self-consumption by the newly settled colonos (small-scale farmers) and for 
sale onto regional markets, particularly in the coastal cities. These initial attempts 
at establishing irrigated agriculture were characterised by relatively small size of 
irrigation projects, allocation of small plots of land to farmers and utilisation of 
basic (ditch) irrigation. Main crops grown were corn, beans, onions and tomatoes. 
A former regional development agency employee explained the trial and error 
atmosphere surrounding these first forays: ’At that time no-one wanted to settle 
on these projects… they were afraid and thought that it would not work out, [and] 
we were not sure that it would end up successfully’.lxii 
 
Phase Two Late 1970s – Mid 1990s: During the second phase the majority of 
irrigation project construction took place. Newly constructed districts were 
divided on an approximately 60/40 basis between colonos and firms. Colonos 
received plots of between 6 and 12 hectares and firms between 50 and 100 
hectares. Whilst both colonos and firms received subsidised water and electricity, 
the former were also integrated into an extensive technical assistance and rural 
extension programme subsidised by CODEVASF designed to facilitate irrigated 
agricultural production.  
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Phase Three Mid 1990s – Present: From the mid 1990s the SF valley’s emerging 
horticulture sector was characterised by: A gradual withdrawal of direct 
assistance to colonos by state agencies; an increased role allocated to private 
actors in terms of introducing new crops, knowledge, and marketing connections; 
and a shift in emphasis of land allocation, from relatively lowly capitalised 
colonos to relatively highly capitalised small, medium and large investors. It was 
only during this phase that there emerged a concentrated emphasis on high value, 
export orientated crops by state agencies in collaboration with private sector 
producer cooperatives and marketing associations.  
   
 
4.3 – The Grape Sector’s Labour Regime and Labour Process  
By the mid 2000’s there were up to 50,000 workers in the grape sector. Export-
orientated grape producers had to meet rising buyer and market requirements to 
export to the UK and mainland Europe.  For example, between the late 1980s and 
early 2000s they had to increase grape berry size from about 17mm to 25mm to 
meet increasingly stringent buyer standards. Exporting farms employ expert 
consultant agronomists for advice and guidance.  
 To achieve product and process upgrading exporting farms have increased 
the number of operations performed by workers. These include bunch and branch 
pruning, application of pesticides and fertilizers, soil analysis, tying back 
branches, cutting back shoots, and pre-harvest sugar content analysis. Whilst 
farms have detailed production calendars, variations in each plant cycle, 
depending on climatic conditions, mean that agronomists and managers must 
continually monitor plant, berry and bunch growth in order to ensure the 
operations are carried out at the optimal moment of the cycle.  
 Market orientation influences farm-level class formation. Rapid product 
and process upgrading by exporting farms has contributed to a steeply diverging 
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production processes within the grape sector. For example, whilst farms 
producing for domestic street markets carry out around 9 operations per harvest 
cycle, employ fewer workers and are much less capital intensive, exporters to the 
UK require more than 30 operations, employ more workers and utilise advanced 
technologies and plant management techniques.  
Improving fruit quality means training workers to avoid waste and 
inefficiency, and to perform new tasks that contribute to the production of higher 
quality and priced fruit. The rising skill-intensity of labour required for export 
grape production, combined with high number of operations required during the 
relatively short harvest cycle has provided workers with important new sources 
of structural bargaining power vis-a-vis capital.  
Just as labouring class formation differs according to market destination, 
so does the formation of the valley-wide capitalist class. Employers on export-
orientated farms tend to be richer, better organised (integrated into valley-wide 
producers organisations) and have more access to capital and technology than 
employers on smaller domestically orientated farms. The formation of different 
class fractions amongst employers has contributed to distinct relations between 
sections of capital and between sections of capital and labour.lxiii  
 
4.4 Workers’ Bargaining Power and Social Upgrading 
Workers, organised by the rural workers’ union -  the Sindicato de Trabalhadores 
Rurais (STR) won significant concessions from exporting farms in the SF valley 
from the mid 1990s onwards. As a lawyer from the STR described it: 
 
Before we had the collective agreement, working on grape farms could be  
very dangerous. Workers were transported to the farms on top of lorries, 
they had to apply insecticides without using protective clothing, they might 
hurt themselves at work and not be able to continue working, and then the 
boss would sack them. Lunch breaks were not specified, with workers 
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sometimes being forced to work throughout the day without a break, and 
safe drinking water was not provided.lxiv  
 
The rural workers union began campaigning for improved workers’ rights and 
conditions. In 1994 it signed a collective agreement with employers in the valley 
institutionalising several improvements. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 
2000s the STR adopted a strategy of striking or threatening to strike during the 
harvest calendar in order to protect and extend gains won from employers. Such 
strikes were designed to threaten the quality of the grapes and reduce their market 
price. Gains to workers included basic pay 10 percent above the national 
minimum wage, overtime payments up to 70 percent above the basic rate, paid 
maternity leave, the provision of on farm crèche facilities, the right to trade union 
representation, and the provision of safe transport to work.  
The complex labour process combined with strictly timed export windows 
means that agronomists must specify exactly when production operations must 
take place. If they are not carried out on time fruit quality declines rapidly. Under 
these conditions trade unions have been quite successful in mobilising their 
members to take strategic strike action at key points in the production calendar, 
and in so doing threatening farms with the possibility of producing sub export-
standard grapes leading to financial loss.lxv  
 
5 – CONCLUSIONS 
This article attempts to establish a class-relational basis for GVC analyses. 
Section two criticised the concept of strategic-coupling, showing how it generates 
a misleading comprehension of development. The concept is a-historical and a-
social because of its firm-centrism. Consequently it is ill-placed to comprehend 
how capitalist expansion and human development are complex and contradictory 
processes rooted in evolving (often conflictive) class relations. Because the 
strategic coupling concept is concerned primarily with intentional development 
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policy, it cannot appreciate the unintentionality and indeterminacy of the 
development process.  It proffers simplistic policy formulations based upon linear 
conceptions of development.  It obscures how actors other than firms and states, 
in particular labouring classes and their organisations, can generate more 
progressive human developmental outcomes.  
 Section three provided some initial building blocks for conducting a class-
relational GVC analysis. Such an analysis should start from capitalism’s core 
social relations – the globally constituted capital-labour relation, and endless 
competitive accumulation between firms. By framing the analysis of inter-firm 
relations within the context of competition between firms, and within the context 
of globally-constituted capital-labour relations, it illuminates social dynamics 
that are usually neglected by mainstream GVC analysis.  
 Section four used the case study of export grape production in North East 
Brazil to illustrate how the region emerged, not because of intentional state policy, 
but because of complicated historical processes of class struggle, dictatorship, 
mega state-investments, an emergent global retail revolution rooted in particular 
national class dynamics (in the UK) and, only very recently, the conjoining of 
these processes though GVCs. It demonstrated how global retail capital 
determines significantly the production, reproduction and existence of local 
working classes in the region. It also showed how the labour process provides 
workers with novel forms of bargaining power which they have used to 
ameliorate their conditions and engender more progressive human development 
than would have accrued to them based on ‘passive’ employment by globally 
orientated supplier firms.   
Whilst GVC analysis is correct in identifying ways in which lead firms 
govern value chains to raise their competitiveness, often through imposing cost-
down pressures upon suppliers, it misses out a larger piece of the puzzle. That is 
how lead firms, in collaboration with international institutions, states and national 
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capital, have sought to create an internationally fragmented labouring class in 
order to raise the rate of labour exploitation.  
It is also the case, however, that many movements by workers can be 
understood as struggles by an emerging global collective worker for the 
generation and realisation of its own collective identity – through trade union and 
landless labourer mobilisations, strikes against low pay and sub-standard 
conditions, pro-labour activism by NGO’s, women’s organisations, anti-
sweatshop campaigns and other forces that challenge the power of capital. A 
class-relational GVC analysis de-fetishises the power of firms and states by 
illuminating ways in which the latter seek to exploit labouring classes the world 
over. And it tries to highlight how labouring classes are able not only able to resist 
such attempts at heightened exploitation, but in so doing, to generate their own 
class dynamics of human development.  
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